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The Consequences of Expiring Commercial Shared-
Loss Agreements
I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2008, as the financial crisis worsened, and an
increasing number of banks flat-lined, the FDIC responded by
resurrecting shared loss agreements (SLA) as a mechanism for aiding in
the disposal of failed bank assets.' Not seen since the Saving and Loan
Crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, SLAs provided the necessary
incentive for acquiring institutions 2 (AI) to take on the troubled assets
of their fallen brethren.3 Due to depressed asset values and investors'
corresponding demand for steep liquidity and risk discounts at the
time,4 SLAs were an essential component of the resolution process that
transferred the troubled assets of failed banks to healthy institutions.
The FDIC asserts that in many situations these agreements provided the
least costly means for resolving failed banking institutions 6 because by
providing coverage for future losses, they allowed the FDIC to sell
troubled assets at prices closer to those in a normal, non-depressed
market.'
1. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REPORT TO CONGRESS, REP.
EVAL-14-002, COMPREHENSIVE STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF THE FAILURE OF INSURED
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, 7 (Jan. 2013), available at http://fdicig.gov/reportsl3%5C13-
002EV.pdf. ("Faced with increasing failures, declining asset values, and losses that depleted
the DIF, the FDIC reinstituted the use of SLAs in November 2008.").
2. Also referred to as "assuming institutions" at times.
3. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1, at 20 ("The FDIC has reported that
turmoil in the economy and significant uncertainty about future loan performance and
collateral values necessitated the use of loss sharing, especially early in the crisis, because
potential buyers of failing institutions were unwilling to take on the credit risk associated
with potential buyers of failing institutions were unwilling to take on the credit risk
associated with failed bank assets, without some form of loss protection.").
4. FDIC, Loss-Share Questions and Answers,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/lossshare/ (last updated Oct. 2, 2013)
[hereinafter Loss-Share Questions and Answers].
5. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1, at 10.
6. FDIC Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(4) (2012) (requiring the FDIC to resolve
failing institutions in the least costly manner).
7. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1, at 24 n. 20; Loss-Share Questions
and Answers, supra note 4 ("These agreements enable the FDIC to sell the assets today, but
without requiring that the FDIC accept today's low prices.").
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The SLAs presumably gave Als the buffer necessary to work
out the salvageable, troubled assets.8 The five-year term of coverage
was based on the presumption that the overall health of the economy
would sufficiently rebound within the loss-sharing period and that many
of the troubled assets would correspondingly regain value and stability.9
But now as expiration nears, significant uncertainty remains as to the
degree of economic recovery'o and the health of remaining SLA
assets." With the coverage for commercial assets provided by the first
agreements executed in 2009 coming to an end in 2014,12 covered assets
that remain troubled have placed Als in a perilous position-forcing
banks to contemplate the resolution of these remaining assets in
strategic terms.' 3 Indeed, present circumstances lead some to "wonder
whether these deals' 4 Will fully pay off for acquirers."' 5  Although the
presumption upon which the agreements were built-that overall
improvement of the economy would have reached a point to eliminate
the uncertainty surrounding the future of SLA assets-has proven to be
8. Telephone Interview with Lorranie M. Buerger, Schiff Hardin (Oct. 10, 2013).
9. FDIC, SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS 2 (2010)
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisuml0/Slsuml0.pdf
("The FDIC is making greater use of the loss-sharing agreements which not only allow the
Corporation to sell failed bank assets at the time of failure, but also provide the opportunity
to recover prior asset losses when market conditions improve.").
10. See e.g., Jon Hilsenrath & Victoria McGrane, Fed Opts to Stay the Course, for
Now, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052702303618904579167811643963976
("Seeing a more uneven economic climate than they expected . .. Federal Reserve officials
got cold feet Wednesday and decided to keep their signature easy-money program in place
for the time being.").
11. Rachel Witkowski, Failed-Bank Buyers Grow Increasingly Eager to Unload
Covered Loans, AM. BANKER (Aug. 10, 2012, 3:21 PM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177 155/failed-bank-buyers-grow-eager-to-unload-
covered-loans-1051750-1.html ("We also find that while some of these loans are paying
today, they may not be paying tomorrow or the next year.").
12. Shannon Lambert, Spotlight: Loss Share Agreements, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
ATLANTA (2013), http://www.frbatlanta.org/pubs/financialupdate/13q2-vploss-
share-agreements.cfm (according to chart 1, in 2014 will expire SLA coverage will expire
for the acquired commercial assets of 77 banks representing a combined originally acquired
value of $103.3 billion - the greatest value in a single year).
13. Lisa G. Quateman & Tracy M. Ginn, FDIC Loss-Sharing Arrangements,
BANKNEWS (May 2013),
http://www.banknews.com/Single-News-
Page.5 1.0.html?&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bttnews%5D-1 891 0&txttnews%5BbackPid
%5D=185&cHash=ff58d81132.
14. Term "deals" referring to the acquisitions made by Als with loss sharing.
15. Witkowski, supra note 11.
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inaccurate and overly optimistic, alternatives for how Als may deal with
SLA assets have not changed, leaving Als boxed in with few options.
Banks, as self-interested actors,' 6 must respond rationally to the
expiration of SLAs and are legitimately incentivized to take action to
claim losses under the agreements, before being subjected to the full
exposure of any remaining troubled assets.17 As expiration dates
approach on the commercial shared-loss agreements (CSLA), slow
economic recovery and corresponding persistent asset uncertainty
operate to influence the behavior of Als managing remaining loss-share
assets.
This Note examines the shifting incentives for Als and affirms
the legitimacy of their conduct on the eve of commercial loss-sharing
expiration. Part II of this Note explains the evolution of loss sharing;' 8
while Part III describes the structure of the SLAs used by the FDIC
during the financial crisis, including information on how SLAs fit into
the resolution process.19 Part IV discusses the legitimacy of the use of
SLAs.20 Part V provides information on the collection process under
the agreements. 2' Part VI combines the incentives and the behavior
SLA expiration induces in an analysis that affirms the legitimacy of Als
prioritizing collection on SLAs prior to their expiration.22 Part VII is a
discussion of potential bulk SLA asset sales, 23 and Part VIII is a brief
conclusion.24
16. See Kerry Singe, Acquiring Failed Banks, Squeezing Borrowers: BB&T Among
Lenders Questioned by Judges, Commercial-Loan Customers, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Dec.
22, 2012), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/12/22/v-print/3743261/acquiring-failed-
banks-squeezing.html. (". . . banks that acquire failed [banks] are not supposed to be
'philanthropic' or forgive debt, said Pamela Farwig, deputy director of the FDIC's Division
of Resolutions and Receiverships.").
17. Webinar: FDIC Loss Sharing Arraignments: The End Game, held by Situs, SNL
Financial, & Polsinelli (Oct. 16, 2013) (on file with author); see also infra Part VI.A
pertaining to the accounting and regulatory reporting for SLA assets.
18. See infra Part II
19. See infra Part III
20. See infra Part IV
21. See infra Part V
22. See infra Part VI
23. See infra Part VII
24. See infra Part VIII
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II. RESOLUTION OF INSOLVENT BANKS AND DEVELOPMENT OF SLA
APPROACH
The desire to transfer increased numbers of failed bank assets to
private, healthy banks and the corresponding techniques to effectuate
that desire developed over the course of the Saving and Loan Crisis
serve as the foundations for contemporary loss-sharing practices. As the
number of banking failures climbed in the late 1980s, the FDIC
recognized that while selling-off assets had not been a priority in the
past, the strategy of retaining assets as receiver would prove disastrous25
in an environment of increased bank failures. 26 During the Saving and
Loan Crisis, the FDIC determined that private banks were better suited
to manage a large portfolio of failed bank assets 27 and began to shift
towards methods intended to transfer larger quantities of assets to
healthy institutions.28
Prior to the 1980s, cash and cash equivalents were the only
assets Als would acquire "on an 'as is' basis at book value." 29 Without
loss-sharing, acquisition prices for a failed bank's assets (other than
cash) include steep liquidity and risk discounts, 30 reflecting a desire to
limit "exposure to unexpected deterioration in the loan asset
portfolio." 31 The resulting, often "unrealistically low," bids to acquire
25. FDIC, RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK, 21 (2003),
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-4700.html (quoting L. William Seidman,
Full Faith and Credit: The Great S & L Debacle and Other Washington Sagas, 100 (1993))
("This was not a serious problem in an agency with very few failed banks, and when the
FDIC insurance fund had lots of cashFalse But it could be disastrous as the number of bank
failures increasedFalse The strategy of holding on to assets would swallow up all our cash
very quickly.").
26. The Depositors Insurance Fund ensures the "sound, effective, and uninterrupted
operation of the banking system" during times of crisis by guaranteeing the "safety and
liquidity of bank deposits." Stanley V. Ragalsevsky & Sarah J. Ricardi, Anatomy of a Bank
Failure, 126 BANKING L.J. 867, 872 (Nov./Dec. 2009) (quoting H. Rep. No 2564, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. reported in 1950 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3765, 3765-3766.).
27. RESOLUTIONs HANDBOOK supra note 25, at 22.
28. RESOLUTIONs HANDBOOK supra note 25, at 24 ("Because of the tremendous
increase in bank and thrift failures during the 1980s, the FDIC began to consider techniques
and incentives to sell substantially more of the failed institution's assets to the acquirer.").
29. RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 20 (Cash equivalents are accounts that
are readily convertible to cash).
30. Loss-Share Questions and Answers, supra note 4; RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK, supra
note 25, at 19-20 ("Because asset values are generally overstated in a failing bank or thrift,
the FDIC's ability to sell assets to an acquiring institution based on book value was
limited.").
31. Ragalsevsky & Ricardi, supra note 26, at 877.
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failed bank assets limits the FDIC's ability to sell the assets and keep
them in the private market. 32 In order to pass a greater amount of assets
on to private banks and avoid prohibitively low bids, the FDIC began
conducting valuation reviews aimed at establishing acquisition prices3 3
that more accurately captured the risks associated with the assets of
failed institutions. 34 In the financial crisis, the FDIC sought to further
supplement the valuation process through loss sharing.35
The administration of loss-sharing assets aspect of SLAs also
traces its evolution back to the Saving and Loan Crisis. In 1989
Congress established the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) 36 to act as
receiver and conservator of insolvent thrifts, with the goal of resolving
those assets that were not transferred to Als.37 Unlike the FDIC, which
"emphasized the sale of the maximum amount of the failed bank's
assets to the bank acquirer at resolution," 38 the RTC passed troubled
assets to willing Als in a piecemeal fashion with the objectives of
"maximiz[ing] the net present value return from the disposition of failed
thrifts and their assets [and] minimiz[ing] the effect of such transactions
on local real estate and financial markets." 39 The resolution process of
failed banks in the most current crisis shared similar goals. 40 However,
32. See Ragalsevsky & Ricardi, supra note 26, at 877 ("In a whole bank P&A
transaction, the purchaser assumes all deposit liabilities, not just FDIC insured deposit
liabilities. This gives 100 percent protection to uninsured depositors and results in unlimited
deposit insurance coverage to all depositors at a higher resolution cost to FDIC. For these
reasons, whole bank P&A transactions are often not the least cost resolution method for
FDIC in comparison to other resolution options.").
33. RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 20.
34. RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 20 (established value by asset review
performed by FDIC staff instead of relying on the recorded book value.); Loss Share
Questions and Answers supra note 4.
35. Ragalsevsky & Ricardi, supra note 26, at 877 ("FDIC currently addresses this
problem by offering loss sharing arrangements in P&A transactions.").
36. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183.
37. FDIC, MANAGING THE CRISIS - THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 1980, 17 (1998),
[hereinafter MANAGING THE CRISIS] available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/.
38. MANAGING THE CRISIS, supra note 35, at 19.
39. MANAGING THE CRISIS, supra note 35, at 17. The RTC had a third objective to
maximize the availability and affordability of residential real property for low- and
moderate-income individuals, which is not relevant to the scope of this note. Id.
40. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1, at 24 ("Preserving asset values should, in
turn, minimize the impact that failed bank assets have on local markets. Als are required to
undertake loss mitigation efforts and to use their best efforts to maximize collections from
assets, which helps support collateral values in the failed bank's market.").
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through SLAs, Als, rather than the FDIC or an RTC-like entity, were
tasked with administering the troubled, as well as the sound, assets. The
use of SLAs in purchase and assumption (P&A) transactions 41 induced
Als to acquire the failed institutions' less attractive troubled assets -
thus supplanting the need for an RTC-like entity.42
III. Loss-SHARING COMPLEMENTING WHOLE BANK P&A
TRANSACTIONS
The SLAs used in the financial crisis typically appeared as
attachments to whole bank P&A agreements.43 Once the FDIC has
decided to close a particular banking institution, it evaluates the bank's
assets and selects the least costly resolution method.44 Of the resolution
methods available to the FDIC, 4 5 the P&A transaction is the preferred,46
and most frequently utilized, method.47 A P&A transaction may be
structured in a variety of ways depending on the assets to be acquired,
the liabilities involved, and the incentives offered. Most P&A
transactions can be categorized by the portion of the failed institution's
assets to be acquired and are classified as either a whole bank
transaction-where most of the failed bank's assets and liabilities are
acquired-or a modified/clean bank form in which the transaction
involves acquisition of only the failed bank's core FDIC insured
deposits with the Al paying a premium for the value of the future
41. RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 33 (indicating that SLAs can be
combined with other types of resolution agreements).
42. Damian Paletta, Raft of Deals for Failed Banks Puts US. on Hook for Billions, W.
ST.J., Aug. 31, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB125166830374670517 ("During
the savings-and-loans crisis ... the government set up the Resolution Trust Corp. to take
over assets from failed banks and sell them. Such a structure doesn't exist now, which
means that the FDIC has to take on those assets or somehow persuade healthy banks to do
so.").
43. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1, at 10.
44. Ragalsevsky & Ricardi, supra note 26, at 868.
45. FDIC Act of 1933 § 13(c)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (2012) (listing legal options
for bank resolution. Since 1991 the FDIC is required by law to chose the least costly
method.).
46. RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 27 ("The FDIC's preference for
passing assets to acquirers became formal corporate policy on December 30, 1986. The
FDIC Board of Directors established an order of priority, known as 'sequential bidding,' for
six alternative transaction methods based on the amount of assets passed to the acquirer."
(whole bank purchase and assumption listed as the first in list of six organized in order of
preference)).




Whole bank P&A transactions offer advantages in efficiency
and the ability to quickly "reduce the number of assets held by FDIC for
liquidation and their associated liquidation costs." 4 9 Since Als assume
all of the failed bank's assets in a pure whole bank P&A, "including bad
loans, on an 'as is' basis at book value," bids are conservative and often
negative.50  The addition of loss-sharing to a whole bank P&A
transaction alleviates to some degree overly pessimistic hedging that
results in low bids. Loss-sharing discourages "unrealistic low bids" in a
whole bank P&A by addressing the difficulty of valuing failed bank
assets in an uncertain economic environment. Instead of
disproportionally discounting the price of assets to compensate for
financial uncertainty, and to further mitigate the risks associated with
the limited time to conduct due diligence, the reluctance to acquire
portfolios of loans underwritten by a failed institution, and the inherent
uncertainty of commercial real estate markets, the FDIC incentivizes the
transfer of all of the assets by agreeing to share in the future losses that
exceed a discounted price threshold associated with a fixed pool of
troubled assets. 52  Loss-sharing facilitates a whole bank P&A
transaction by encouraging an Al to take on assets it would otherwise
not acquire at a price acceptable to the FDIC. In turn, by including
more overall assets in the transaction, the ratio of liabilities to assets is
decreased - even if those assets are considered troubled.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 877.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 879 ("Loss sharing encourages bidding based on an accurate valuation of as-
sets, and thus allows FDIC to maximize the bank's value while at the same time disposing
its assets efficiently. It discourages unrealistically low bids designed to hedge against the
risk of greater than anticipated losses.); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1, at 24
("During the crisis, SLAs helped to preserve asset values and reduce the FDIC's resolution
costs. Asset prices were low and investors were demanding steep liquidity and risk
discounts when bidding on failed bank assets. In such circumstances, loss-sharing
guarantees enabled the FDIC to sell failed bank assets at prices closer to their intrinsic value
instead of accepting depressed prices."); Paletta, supra note 39 (quoting Len Williams, chief
Executive of Home Federal Bank) ("The hardest part today in the acquisition game is
valuing assets for determining real equity, and with a loss share you can do that").
52. RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 29.
53. See infra Part Ill.
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A. Structure of SLAs
"Assets in a loss-sharing transaction are valued at the failed
bank's book value plus a premium or minus a discount offered by
bidders;" accordingly, an Al may either pay the FDIC for the assets or
actually receive a payment from the FDIC.54 In a whole bank P&A
with loss-sharing, the initial cash exchange is determined by combining
the "asset premium or discount bid, the franchise value bid for the failed
institution's deposit base, and the difference between the book values of
the assets acquired and the liabilities assumed from the failed
institution."55  If the sum is a negative amount, the FDIC makes a
payment of that amount to the acquirer.56  If the sum is a positive
number, "the amount represents the amount of loss the bidder is willing
to absorb on the purchase of assets and assumptions of liabilities of the
failed bank before receiving FDIC loss share protections" and the Al
makes an upfront payment of that amount to the FDIC.5 7  In many
transactions, the upfront payment by the Al establishes a first loss
threshold-essentially serving as a deductible-with the FDIC
providing loss coverage once losses exceed the amount paid.
Troubled assets are categorized as either single-family home
assets or commercial assets, with each pool provided with loss-sharing
protection under separate SLAs. Single-family home mortgage related
assets are protected from losses associated with modifications, short
sales, foreclosure sales, and charge-offs for a ten-year span.59 SLAs for
commercial assets provide loss coverage for a five-year period, while
recoveries are shared during the course of loss-sharing plus an
additional three years subsequent. 60 A typical SLA is structured in such
a way that the FDIC reimburses 80% of the losses on the specified pool
of assets, while the acquiring institution absorbs the remaining 20% of




55. FDIC, supra note 9, at 4.
56. Id. at 3.
57. JoNESDAY, supra note 54.
58. FDIC, supra note 9, at 3.
59. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1, at 21.
60. FDIC, supra note 9, at 3.
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losses.6' SLAs entered into prior to April 2010 provided for an increase
in reimbursements from 80% to 95% once aggregate losses exceeded an
upper-loss threshold.62 The FDIC makes payments for losses on
covered assets when, and if, the acquiring institution charges-off the
assets in accordance with applicable standards.63
B. Commercial SLAs of the Financial Crisis
At the time of the financial crisis, commercial real estate (CRE)
loans made up more than one-third of community bank lending. 64 An
unhealthy concentration of CRE loans was a common attribute among
failed institutions, often serving as the primary reason for institutional
failure.65 The same CRE assets that contributed so profoundly in the
demise of institutions, have continued to play a pivotal and persistent
role in the process of resolving their past benefactors.
Because high concentrations of CRE loans were such a common
feature of failed institutions, loss-sharing relating to commercial assets
became a prevalent aspect of resolution efforts. Since 2009, loss-
sharing for commercial assets has been used in the resolution of 307
failed banks 66 with a combined initial asset value of $214.8 billion of
which $91.3 billion remains currently covered.67 A majority of those
agreements will expire in the next two years. Loss-sharing for the
seventy-seven transactions that utilized CSLAs in 2009 with a
combined initial value of $103.3 billion will expire in 2014; and in the
following year, the CSLAs used in the resolution of 126 failed bank
resolutions in 2010 with an initial value of $62 billion will also expire.68
As of September 24, 2013, $6.8 billion in covered commercial loans
were past due and in nonaccrual status. 69
61. Ragalsevsky & Ricardi, supra note 23.
62. Id.
63. FDIC, supra note 9, at 3; See Infra Part V for SLA collection process.
64. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1, at 2.
65. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1, at 2 (" [L]osses in ADC and other types
of CRE loans, often related to residential real estate lending, figured prominently in many
smaller institution failures.").
66. FDIC, Failed Banks/Loss Share Agreements,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklistlossshare.html (last updated Dec. 24,
2013) (one bank used a CSLA prior to 2009 in 2008).
67. Id.
68. Webinar, supra note 17.
69. Id.
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IV. LEGITIMACY OF THE USE OF LosS-SHARING
In times of increased institutional failure, such as the financial
crisis, SLAs provide an affordable means of incentivizing the retention
of failed bank assets in the private banking sector.70 "Banks are capable
of managing significant levels of distressed assets in a fashion that can
facilitate orderly liquation," 71 and exploiting this capability by placing
the burden of administering troubled assets with private banks, instead
of with the FDIC, reduces total resolution costs which in turn lessen the
overall cash burden on the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) 72 itself.73
Bank failures cause broad disruption to both borrowers and local
markets in general; because SLAs allow the FDIC to sell assets to other
private institutions, the overall disturbance to both consumers and
surviving institutions is reduced, enabling the failed bank's borrowers to
remain in the local banking market. 74 In the absence loss-sharing, Als
may have otherwise refused to acquire the troubled assets of a failed
institution at a price acceptable to the FDIC. Consequently, those
unacquired troubled assets would have either been retained or liquidated
by the FDIC.7 s Subsequent liquidation would have driven down the
market value of similar collateral of other surviving institutions in an
already suffering economy.76 Overall, the use of SLAs enabled the
FDIC to include more failed bank assets in P&A transactions, which
prevented the use of other resolutions methods that would have further
depressed asset values in the market.7
Crucial to the soundness of loss-sharing as a legitimate
resolution method is the inherent structural alignment of Als' incentives
with those of the FDIC. The fundamental sharing aspect of SLAs
induces 78 rational and responsible credit management behavior from
70. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1.
71. Richard B. Gaudet, Loss-Sharing Agreements Between the FDIC and Acquiring
Banks: Advice for the Borrower, 29 ABI J., 1 (2010).
72. Quateman & Ginn, supra note 13.
73. Ragalsevsky & Ricardi, supra note 26, at 875.
74. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1, at 22 ("Without SLAs to attract potential
acquirers of failing institutions, the FDIC would have been forced to take ownership of the
failed institution's assets and liquidated those assets, which has historically resulted in
greater disruption to local markets and been more costly").
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 21.
78. Loss Share Questions and Answers, supra note 4 ("[T]he FDIC sells to assuming
586 [Vol. 18
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Als as they seek to avoid unnecessary losses of any proportion.79
Although critics allege that since Als are not subject to a majority of the
losses associated with a particular failed loan they are less likely to
modify the loan,80 the FDIC Office of Inspector General found8 ' that
SLAs either encouraged or had no impact on Als' rate of loan
modifications. 82  The FDIC also asserts that Als have an additional
incentive to work with borrowers to restructure troubled loans in order
to establish ongoing relationships and thus capitalize on the expanded
client base gained in the acquisition. Aside from the incentives born of
the loss-sharing structure, the actual terms of the agreements themselves
expressly mandate obligations that increase the probability Als will
make appropriate efforts to modify loans, preventing an institution from
prematurely claiming losses. 84 The combined structural incentives and
agreed to obligations found in SLAs impart credible asset management
into the privately administered resolution process making loss sharing a
valuable resolution tool in times of financial turmoil.
V. COLLECTION OF LOSSES UNDER SLAs
Collection on a SLA is warranted when the net charge-offs85 on
banks in a way that aligns their incentives with the FDIC and reduces the liquidity and risk
discounts. The assuming banks have the capacity and incentive to service the assets
effectively and minimize losses."); see Telephone Interview with Lorraine M. Buerger,
supra note 8 ("No bank is going to embrace those losses if there is another path"); Paletta,
supra note 39 ("FDIC officials maintain that because banks still have a 'material' exposure,
they will be reluctant to [put little effort into reworking the soured loans]").
79. RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 24 at 30.
80. Singe, supra note 16.
81. Pub. L. No. Law 112-88, 125 Stat. 1899 (2012) (Required the Office of Inspector
General of the FDIC to study the impact of loss-sharing on the insured depository
institutions that survived and the borrowers of the insured depository institutions that
failed.).
82. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1, at 28.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Bank Purchase and Assumption Agreement for Alliance Bank among FDIC
and California Bank & Trust, 82 FDIC (Feb. 6, 2009), [hereinafter Purchase and
Assumption Agreement], available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/allianceP andA.pdf (defining Net Charge-
Offs as "an amount equal to the aggregate amount of charge-offs for such period less the
amount of recoveries for such period"). The loss-sharing agreement is typically referenced
in the purchase and assumption agreement and attached as an exhibit. The rules referenced
herein related to the administration of loss-share assets are those that were typical in a loss-
sharing agreement from 2009.
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the covered assets, plus any other miscellaneous categories of allowed
expenses, result in a positive figure.87  Charge-offs occur when a
particular asset suffers an adverse classification under the examination
criteria88 of the bank's chartering authority.89 Essentially an Al realizes
losses, compensable under the agreements, in the course of compliance
with the required regulations of their financial supervisory authority. 90
A. Final Resolution Events and Partial Charge-Offs
Als have several regulatory and legal methods available to
trigger a loss-share collection event. A final resolution event, in which
all efforts to make the loan work have failed, offers complete certainty
in calculating losses because once the asset is disposed of, all possible
losses have been realized, and there is no longer any uncertainty of
further costs or losses.9' The traditional final resolution event is a bank
foreclosure on the loan's collateral as a means to recover the balance on
the loan.92  Alternatively, other final resolution events, such as short
sales or discounted pay-offs, may serve as disposition methods for loans
that otherwise do not qualify for modification efforts. 93 While the
86. Id. at 87 (listing other reimbursable expenses).
87. Id. at 90.
88. Id. at 8 (defining Charge Offs as "an amount of loans or portions of loans classified
as 'Loss' under the Examination Criteria," with respect to any Shared-Loss Assets for any
period").
89. See id. (defining Examination Criteria as the "the loan classification criteria
employed by, or any applicable regulations of, the Assuming Bank's Chartering Authority at
the time such action is taken, as such criteria may be amended from time to time").
90. See FDIC, RSAM GUIDANCE 2013-G005, RISK SHARING ASSET MANAGEMENT
GUIDANCE: WORKOUTS FOR ACQUIRED COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE SHARED-Loss LOANS, n.2
(May 28, 2013), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/lossshare/RSAM_Guidance_2013-
G005_CommercialRealEstate.pdf
(explaining that the financial regulators consist of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (FRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),the National
Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) State Liaison
Committee); Telephone Interview with Lorraine M. Buerger, supra note 8 ("Working the
loans as required").
91. See Telephone Interview with Lorraine M. Buerger, supra note 8.
92. Id.
93. See FDIC, RSAM GUIDANCE 2010-009, COMMERCIAL Loss MITIGATION




certainty of a final resolution event is advantageous, it is a difficult
point to reach within the five-year span of SLA coverage. 94
Als have plenty of opportunities to monetize SLAs without a
final resolution event through partial resolution events. 95 Losses due to
mark to market calculations and regulator mandated losses matriculated
through servicing a loan are two of the most frequent causes of
appropriate charge-offs. Additionally, necessary loan modifications
may trigger a partial loss event and subsequent SLA payout.
Mark to market value reductions are the primary means for
short-term monetization of SLAs. 96 Contrary to book value, mark to
market value is a reflection of actual present value.97 Loans, such as
those acquired in P&A transactions, are "evaluated and marked down
when there is a change in the credit relationship." 98 As a result of a
credit event, examination criteria demands an updated appraisal of
collateral to reflect the reduction in the loan's collateralization with a
corresponding reduction in the value of the secured asset in subsequent
regulatory reports. 99
Partial charge-offs that constitute a partial resolution event also
occur in the course of an Al's regular maintenance of an acquired loan.
As a means to avoid unexpected losses, regulatory authorities mandate
that banks actively monitor loans to ensure borrowers are able to fulfill
the obligations under the loan terms.o00 The primary focus when
assessing an outstanding loan is to determine the borrower's ongoing
ability to meet the contractual repayment obligations of the loan
agreement. 10' A legal guarantor with the financial capacity and
willingness to support the borrower may counter the effects of a poorly
situated borrower.102  Another factor involved in the analysis of
outstanding loans is "the cash flow potential of the underlying collateral
94. See Telephone Interview with Lorraine M. Buerger, supra note 8.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF BANKING TERMS 290 (5th ed. 2006).
98. Id.
99. See Telephone Interview with Lorraine M. Buerger, supra note 8.
100. Id.
101. FED. RESERVE BD., POLICY STATEMENT ON PRUDENT COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
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or business.'103 "As the primary sources of loan repayment decline,"
and the likelihood that the institution may have to seek repayment
through sale of the collateral property increases, "the importance of the
collateral's value as a secondary repayment source increases in
analyzing credit risk." 0 4  If a bank in the course of this process is
unable to verify how a borrower will be able to repay the loan or finds
repayment is less likely than originally believed, the loan could be
adversely classified for regulatory purposes. 05 If the bank determines a
loan should suffer an adverse classification, a partial monetization of the
SLA will occur in accordance with the particular classification. 06The
National Bank Examiners' risk classification system 0 7 classifies poorly
performing loans across categories of loss assets, resulting in a compete
write-off; doubtful assets, warranting a fifty percent write-off from book
value; substandard assets; and special mention assets.' 08  The loss
sharing collection would correspond to the appropriate charged off
amount.
B. Characteristics of Covered Loans Subject to Adverse
Classification
There are several types of loans that display patterns of
characteristics that commonly warrant adverse classification. Troubled
CRE loans that are dependent on the sale of collateral for repayment
should be classified a loss for "any portion of the loan balance that
exceeds the amount adequately secured by the market value of the real
103. Id.
104. Id. at 8.
105. See Telephone Interview with Lorraine M. Buerger, supra note 8.
106. Id.
107. The Council is a formal interagency body empowered to prescribe uniform
principles, standards, and report forms for the federal examination of financial institutions
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB), and to make recommendations to promote uniformity in the supervision of
financial institutions. In 2006, the State Liaison Committee (SLC) was added to the Council
as a voting member. The SLC includes representatives from the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors (CSBS), the American Council of State Savings Supervisors (ACSSS), and the
National Association of State Credit Union Supervisors (NASCUS). FEDERAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, http://www.ffiec.gov (Dec. 18, 2013, 3:54 PM).
108. BARRON'S, supra note 97, at 11.
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estate collateral, less the costs to sell" the property.10 9 There are cases
of CRE loans with short maturities that require extended financing, but
even if the borrower has the ability to service the debt, the borrower
may be unable to secure such financing due to deterioration in collateral
values."l0 In these situations, a loan restructuring or modification may
be the in the best interest of all parties,"' but the restructured loan may
nonetheless be subject to an adverse classification and a corresponding
SLA collection.112
More severe assessments occur when an institution determines
that a "well-defined [credit] weakness exists that jeopardize[s]
collection in full [which] may result in a partial charge-off as part of a
restructuring."" 3  Even loans that are contractually current may be
subject to adverse classification, if the repayment of the principal is at
risk.114 This could be the case when the "loan's underwriting structure
or the liberal use of extensions and renewals mask credit
weaknesses.""l5 Other loans, though not in default, may be candidates
for modifications if a modification review request determines there is a
low probability of performance.11 6  Often a charge-off and
corresponding SLA collection will accompany a modification.117
C. Preference for Final Resolution Events
In most cases the ultimate goal of an Al seeking to collect on
loss-share assets is to reach a final resolution event." 8 The most
significant distinction between partial and final resolution events for
SLA purposes is the uncertain future costs associated with partial
monetization. The uncertainty that exists between partial and final
resolution is "where the pain and conflict lurks" for Als.1 9 Those assets
that have only been partially resolved at the time loss-sharing expires
109. FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 101, at 8.
110. Id. at 8.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 9.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 8.
115. FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 101, at 8.
116. FDIC, supra note 93, at 6.
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have the potential to expose the Al to additional costs subsequent to
SLA expiration. On the other hand, once a final resolution event has
occurred, an asset no longer has the potential or risk of generating future
losses.
The desire to reach final resolution is complicated by the fact
that it is common in failing bank environments that inadequate past
maintenance1 20 on loans has created a backlog of tasks that an Al must
makeup.121 This backlog of tasks makes reaching a final resolution, so
that an AI may collect on a SLA, work intensive.1 22 With expiration
nearing for covered commercial assets and the task of marking losses
becoming all the more a priority, Als must ensure they assign sufficient
importance to accomplishing the necessary tasks needed to collect
sooner rather than later.
VI. SHIFT IN COLLECTION BEHAVIOR AND THE NEED TO MONETIZE SLAs
The rules for collection under SLAs found in the agreements are
brief and appear simple in theory, but actual compliance has proven to
be complicated. The agreements require the bank to exercise usual and
prudent business and banking practices, act in accordance with the
bank's practices and procedures, exercise best business judgment, and
use best efforts to maximize collections in the administration of the
loss-share assets.123  These rules indicate that the FDIC expects the
acquiring bank to administer the loss-share assets simply by acting as a
bank managing loans using typical sound business judgment.124
Now, as expiration nears and the future of covered assets
remains uncertain, banks should display a growing urgency to establish
the true value of the loans so that any losses can be recognized before
coverage expires.125  While this may appear as merely an obvious
continuation of what AIs have been doing since initially acquiring the
120. Lenders continuing obligations to analyze a loan's performance.
121. See Telephone Interview with Lorraine M. Buerger, supra note 8; OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1, at 9 ("Many of the banks that failed did so because
management relaxed underwriting standards and did not implement adequate oversight and
controls.").
122. Telephone Interview with Lorraine M. Buerger, supra note 8.
123. See Purchase and Assumption Agreement, supra note 85, at 98-100.
124. Gaudet, supra note 71, at 3 ("[T]he FDIC has contracted with the acquiring bank to
do what the bank does best: manage loans.").
125. See Telephone Interview with Nathan Stovall, SNL Financial (Sept. 23, 2013).
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assets, at this point there is a substantial shift in the underlying
motivation of asset administration. Maximizing collections could fairly
be recast as "exhausting all available collection efforts." 26 Essentially,
as expiration approaches Als should look to "cross all the t's on the
FDIC's list" to demonstrate collection efforts have been made, have
failed, and payment is necessary under the agreement.1 27
A. Why Banks Need to Monetize SLAs Before Expiration
Once loss sharing expires, the health of the remaining acquired
assets will be fully reflected in the financial reports of AIs. SLAs affect
how banks report both their overall financial health, as it relates to
profitability, and their capital adequacy 28 for regulatory purposes. For
purposes of general financial reporting, an institution with a SLA
accounts for the potential payments under the agreement by listing an
indemnification asset.129 As a bank actually incurs losses on the
acquired assets and subsequently charges the losses off, necessitating a
collection under the SLA, it attributes those actual collections to
income, while simultaneously charging-off and reducing the previously
recorded indemnification asset.130 Repayment periods of loans
protected by a SLA typically extend beyond the protection period, thus
requiring the corresponding indemnification asset to be amortized over
the course of the SLA,131 "thereby preventing a residual asset at the
126. Gaudet, supra note 71, at 3.
127. See Telephone Interview with Nathan Stovall, supra note 124 (suggesting that the
FDIC demanded a substantial threshold or showing that the cover loans had been
"worked.").
128. BARRON'S, supra note 97, at 74 ("Capital Adequacy: amount of capital relative to
financial institution's loans and other assets. Almost all banking regulators require that
banks hold a certain minimum of equity capital against their risk-weighted assets.").
129. FASB Exposure Draft Clarifies Indemnification Asset Accounting,
RuBINBROwNLLP, (June 2012),
http://www.rubinbrown.com/component/content/article/239-a-a-a-alert-june-2012/2120-
fasb-exposure-draft-clarifies-indemnification-asset-accounting ("The recognition of an
indemnification asset (an intangible asset) when a seller indemnifies a buyer against losses
on specific acquired assets. The indemnification asset derives its value from, and is
inversely related to, the expected future cash flows associated with the underlying
indemnified purchased asset, such as an account or loan receivable."); Nathan Stovall &
Salman Aleem Khan, Why More Banks Will Take Loss-Share Hits, SNL FINANCIAL, I (Apr.
24, 2013),
http://www.snl.com/InteractiveX/Article.aspx?cdid= A- 17533621-13359.
130. See Telephone Interview with Nathan Stovall, supra note 124.
131. FINANCIAL ACCoUNT STABILiTY BOARD, ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE No.
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maturity date of the indemnification agreement which would occur as a
result of an amortization period exceeding the agreement."l 32
Therefore, when loss-sharing protection expires, so do the accounting
benefits associated with the indemnification classification of SLA
assets. Following SLA expiration those remaining troubled assets will
reflect their full, unprotected weight in subsequent financial reports.
In addition to having to bear all of the losses on the pool of
assets, the expiration of SLAs will impact the capital requirements of
Als.133 Since a SLA provides that the FDIC take 80% of the losses on
the covered pools of assets, the net exposure of those covered assets for
capital adequacy purposes is weighted at only 20%. 134 Thus, once
loss-sharing expires and the indemnification asset ceases to exist, the
acquired assets that are only risk weighted at 20% under the SLA will
experience a shift in risk allocation to account for the entire weight of
the loan. The assigned risk weight will increase to 100%, or in cases of
certain high-volatility CRE loans, to 150%, exposing the bank to the full
liability of the remaining assets.'35  Since many of the covered
commercial assets are speculative CRE loans,136 instances of risk
weighting in excess of 100 percent could be prevalent.' 37 Because even
the healthiest acquired loans often run a greater risk of being classified
risky in the future (post SLA) compared to those originated by the
Al,1 38 the possibility of banks recording impairments that result in
earnings volatility and possibly eventual losses is considerable.139
Nonetheless, there is no guarantee that banks will necessarily
record impairments related to the once-covered assets, and no guarantee
2012-06, BUSINESS COMBINATIONS (TOPIC 805) SUBSEQUENT ACCOUNTING FOR AN
INDEMNIFICATION ASSET RECOGNIZED AT THE ACQUISITION DATE AS A RESULT OF A
GOVERNMENT-ASSISTED ACQUISITION OF A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, (Oct. 2012), available at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey-id&blobwhere=1 175824704251 &blobheader-
application%2Fpdf&blobcol-urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs (Issuance of clarification on
accounting for indemnification assets related to SLAs.).
132. Stovall & Khan, supra note 128.
133. Quateman & Ginn, supra note 13.
134. Sarim Khan & Bill Warlick, FDIC Loss-Sharing expiration little threat to U.S.
Banks, FITCHRATINGS, (Jul. 23, 2013),
http://www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/fitchwire/fitchwirearticle/FDIC-Loss-Sharing-
Expiration?prjid=797437.
135. Khan & Warlick, supra note 133.
136. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1, at 1.
137. Id. at 3.
138. Witkowski, supra note 11.
139. Stovall & Khan, supra note 128.
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those assets that do result in impairments may not produce offsetting
income in the future.14 0  The question becomes: will banks risk the
uncertainty of collecting uncertain future revenue and potential
consequences, while guaranteed collection under the shared loss
agreements remains a viable option?
B. What Type of Conduct Can be Expected and Why It is Rational
Without a more robust economic recovery, Als are incentivized
as SLA expiration nears to operate along a spectrum of increased
rigidity in their willingness to work with borrowers on covered loans.
The incentivized behavior materializes in a change from Als striving to
maximize collections to Als "exhausting all available collection efforts"
so that they may collect under the agreement. 141 With this change,
lenders are not incentivized to be commercially sensible in dealing with
borrowers in the normal sense of banking andl 4 2 borrowers can expect
less accommodation from lenders.14 3
It is difficult to know exactly what particular actions lenders
will take in the run-up to the expiration of loss-sharing; nonetheless, it is
reasonable to expect a general reluctance from Als to continue to
willingly support modification efforts and other accommodations for
borrowers with nonperforming loans. For instance, if a covered
troubled loan has been in work-out mode for the last three to fours years
and refinancing the loan is not possible because the loan remains
under-collateralized, with loss-sharing expiring the rational course of
action is to hedge risks and losses by making every effort to collect
under the SLA.144  While this shift may seem to be unfair or even
malicious towards borrowers, this course of action is not only allowable
under the agreements, but also enjoys support from the FDIC and
industry insiders. Pamela Farwig, Deputy Director of the FDIC's
Division of Resolutions and Receiverships, noted that banks are
140. Id.
141. Gaudet, supra note 71, at 29.
142. Witkowski, supra note 11. ("'We have [failed bank] loans that are paying and
performing but it's not a very good loan' due to the structure, Frawley says, including a lack
of interest-rate floors for some loans. 'We also find that while some of these loans are
paying today, they may not be paying tomorrow or the next year."').
143. See Telephone interview with James Creekman, Ward and Smith P.A. (Sep. 27,
2013).
144. See Telephone Interview with Lorraine M. Buerger, supra note 8.
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required by federal law to maximize their recovery; further noting that
the accommodation seen from lenders in the past is not to be
expected. 145 Thus "any bank with a sizable book of delinquent loans
covered under a loss-share agreement should work those assets hard to
make sure they have marked their covered loans to their true value and
squeezed all the value out of their indemnification assets before their
loss-share agreement expires."' 4 6 If banks fail to take timely action,
they may end up "sitting on a block of loans that becomes distressed
after the loss-share expires, leaving them with no protection from
FDIC."l 47
The fact that Als are obligated to comply with the SLAs' terms
for the three-year recoveries-only period following the end of the five-
year loss-sharing term serves as further incentive for maximizing loan
resolutions prior to expiration. If robust economic recovery was more
certain, as was expected when the agreements were executed, and had
collateral values correspondingly rebounded, Als would be more
inclined to modify or refinance loans due to the availability of adequate
security. Essentially the ability to collect on loss-sharing removes the
uncertainty and risk of continuing to workout the covered loans subject
to full exposure post expiration.
VII. BULK SALES
Most CSLAs provide that at the four-year mark the covered
assets could be sold with the FDIC's prior approval. 148 When Als
entered into the agreements, this sale provision was viewed as a
backstop to the risk of persisting uncertainty as loss-sharing approached
expiration.14 9 Als expected that they would be able to sell at least some
of those assets that remained troubled on the eve of expiration and curb
any further potential future losses on the covered assets. 50
At this point, selling covered assets makes a great deal of sense
145. Singe, supra note 16.
146. Stovall & Khan, supra note 128.
147. Webinar, supra note 17.
148. Quateman & Ginn, supra note 13.
149. Webinar, supra note 17 ("Bankers had hoped that they could purge their balance
sheets after the fourth anniversary of commercial loss-share agreements was reached.");
Telephone Interview with Lorraine M. Buerger, supra note 8.
150. Id.; see Telephone Interview with Lorraine M. Buerger, supra note 8.
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for many Als.15 ' Evidenced by the fact the assets were originally
procured only under SLAs, banks are not as well suited to carry the
effects of full, unprotected exposure to some of these remaining assets
as other financial institutions with different appetites for risk may be.152
The FDIC would benefit from allowing sales because loss-share
coverage would not extend to the buyer.153  Thus, the FDIC would
relinquish its obligation to compensate Als for losses early, potentially
saving DIF funds.
Some believe the FDIC is opposed to allowing sales because at
least some losses would be guaranteed;154 while on the other hand,
forcing banks to hold on to the assets leaves open the possibility that
banks will be able to avoid further losses. 55 In this alleged perspective,
the FDIC fails to consider that the losses from sales could potentially be
less than losses incurred under SLAs held to term.156
Even with these apparent benefits, there is little faith that the
FDIC will allow any large portfolio sales.'5 7  Although there is not a
great deal of belief in bulk sales, some industry professionals are not yet
foreclosing the possibility. Lisa Greer Quateman views the FDIC's
stated intent to establish a committee to review requests for bulk sales15 8
151. See Telephone Interview with James Creekman, supra note 142 (Working loans
under a loss-share agreement is very complex. It also time consuming dealing with loans
originated by another bank. Additionally, borrowers are very litigious when a shared-loss
agreement is involved and it gives them standing for an usually high number of claims.).
152. See Telephone interview with James Creekman, supra note 142.
153. See Purchase and Assumption Agreement, supra note 85, at 98-101.
154. The FDIC would required under the SLA to pay 80% of the losses sustained by the
AI selling the assets and the uncertainty of asset performance (the reason the Al wants to
sell) would most likely mean the assets would be sold at a loss.
155. See Telephone interview with James Creekman, supra note 142; Telephone
Interview with Nathan Stovall, supra note 124.
156. See Telephone interview with James Creekman, supra note 142; Telephone
Interview with Nathan Stovall, supra note 124.
157. Telephone Interview with Nathan Stovall, supra note 124 (There have been some
one-off sales of assets but not any sales of entire portfolios and it does not appear there will
be).
158. State of Community Banking: Is the Current Regulatory Environment Adversely
Affecting Community Financial Institutions? Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial
Services, 1l3th Cong. 76 (2013) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation by Doreen R. Eberley, Director, Division of Risk Management
Supervision; Bret D. Edwards, Director, Division of Resolutions and Receiverships; and
Richard A. Brown, Chief Economist) ("[T]he FDIC's Loan Sale Advisory Review
Committee will review all request for portfolio sales and large individual loan sales to
ensure a consistent approach to the approval process . . . ").
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as a potential indication that such sales will be allowed. 5 9 The potential
exists for the FDIC to merely withhold consent for the time being in
order to incentivize Als to continue to work to maximize recoveries.' 60
VIII. CONCLUSION
While it is important to understand that Als are acting within
their legal bounds and out of legitimate self-interest, it is equally
important to keep in mind the consequences of their behavior on a wider
level. The expiration of SLAs introduces an incentive for Als to off-
load loans and collect on the SLA, instead of attempting to pursue
modifications-greatly undermining the benefits of the P&A
transactions that allowed loans to remain with an institution rather than
being liquidated and thus not flooding the market with depressed
collateral. Although the real estate markets have recovered to a degree,
foreclosures on collateral securing covered assets could result in the
resurgence of downward pressure on property prices. Nonetheless, Als
must rationally act in their self-interest and adjust their behavior to
recognize now is the time to realize losses.
ROBERT C. MARTIN
159. Webinar, supra note 17 (Lisa Greer Quateman is a managing partner at Polsinelli
and specializes in capital markets and regulatory matters.).
160. Hearing, supra note 158.
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